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SUMMARY 
INTRODUCTION   
In spite of a commendable 40 percent reduction in the maternal mortality ratio over the last decade 
to 194 per 100,000 live births in 2010, improving maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH) care 
remains a key development priority given the high inequality that persists between the richest and 
the poorest quintiles in Bangladesh. The service delivery systems are met with both supply and 
demand side barriers. Recent consensus aims to reduce these barriers to improve basic and 
emergency obstetric care, institutional delivery, skilled birth attendance, and family planning 
services. To reduce both demand- and supply-side barriers, a demand-side financing (DSF) scheme 
was introduced in 2006, which is a combination of supply-side incentives for providers and demand-
side cash transfers for clients. Although the DSF scheme increased the volume of services provided, 
the quality of care was not addressed; also it promoted performance of individual providers instead 
of that of the facility. In this context, the Population Council explored the possibilities of introducing a 
Pay-for-Performance (P4P) scheme to improve maternal health care services by using a consultative 
process. Based on the consultation and in guidance of the Government of Bangladesh, the Council 
and UNICEF provided technical assistance to the Directorate General of Health Services (DGHS) to 
test the P4P strategies for MNCH service providers to improve service volume and quality of care, 
and for the poor clients to receive services subsidized through vouchers or coupons. Using a pre-test 
post-test separate sample quasi-experimental design, the study tests two strategies. The first 
strategy is a combination of pay-for-performance for providers and subsidized coupons for poor 
pregnant women, newborns, and under-five children, while the second strategy employs only the pay-
for-performance incentives for the providers.  
OBJECTIVES 
The objective of the study is to test and compare the two service delivery models on utilization of 
MNCH services to improve maternal, newborn and under-five children’s health. The specific 
objectives are to (i) test the feasibility of implementing performance incentives for providers; and (ii) 
evaluate whether payment for providers, with or without subsidized financing for clients, results in 
increased utilization of antenatal care, postnatal care, institutional deliveries, and family planning 
counseling. 
DURATION 
The project was initiated in mid-February 2010 and ended in December 2011. The intervention 
period was from October 2010 to November 2011.  
STUDY SITES  
Twelve public-sector health facilities in Jamalpur, Gaibandha and Kurigram districts are the 
intervention sites and three facilities of Thakurgaon district comprise the comparison sites. The 
DGHS selected these four districts out of its eight maternal and newborn health (MNH) and MNCH 
project districts as of 2010. 
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ACTIVITIES  
The preparatory activities included development of guidelines and manuals, and the formation of 
P4P Committees, Quality Assurance Groups (QAGs), Quality Assurance Teams (QATs), fund 
operations teams and the MNCH service providers’ teams. A quality assurance system was 
developed allowing providers to receive incentives based on facilities’ achievement of targets of 
volume and quality of care of emergency obstetric and newborn care (EmONC) services (Figure 3). A 
coupon mechanism was developed to provide incentives to the poor clients to receive EmONC 
services (Figure 4). A financial mechanism was established through signing contracts between the 
facilities and the Council. In the communities, the fieldworkers and volunteers were trained, and 
15,696 eligible women were identified using a community level validation process. Of them, 90 
percent received coupons and about half received MNCH services from the designated facilities. 
Coupon utilization was the highest for antenatal care services followed by delivery, postnatal 
complications and delivery complications management. The referral mechanism was strengthened 
and all the stakeholders received orientation.  
Intervention activities included the QAG visits every quarter while the facilities provided improved 
MNCH care and the P4P Committees and QATs carried out monitoring activities. When facilities 
received a positive recommendation upon meeting its targets, they provided incentives to the MNCH 
teams. In Gaibandha and Kurigram districts, financial assistance in the form of coupon was provided 
to poor clients to cover transportation, medicine and incidental costs.  
The evaluation activities used a separate sample quasi-experimental pre-post test design and 
collected: baseline and endline survey data from 473 providers (Baseline 272; Endline 201) from 15 
facilities; monthly service statistics from the 15 facilities over 26 months (pre-intervention- 12 
months, during intervention- 14 months); quality of care measurements at the 12 intervention 
facilities over 6 quarters; client exit interviews with 2,124 clients at the 15 facilities during the 
intervention period; and in-depth interviews with 270 clients at the 15 facilities during the 
intervention period. 
RESULTS 
Feasibility of implementing performance incentives for providers and clients is measured in terms of 
operationalization of the incentive schemes, increased volume of services and improvement in 
quality of care of the MNCH services at the intervention facilities. Comparison across strategies and 
comparison sites indicates that payment for providers, with or without financing for clients, results in 
increased utilization of MNCH services. 
Change in service volume. The increase in service volume was significantly higher at the intervention 
facilities relative to comparison facilities in terms of institutional delivery (Table A.1 and Figure 8). 
Institutional deliveries increased by 114 and 32 percent in facilities under strategies I and II, 
respectively, relative to the comparison facilities. Strategy I facilities registered higher increases than 
strategy II facilities. Antenatal and postnatal care services increased significantly in strategy I sites 
relative to comparison sites, but performance in these sites varied significantly during the baseline 
survey; therefore, the differences cannot be attributed to the intervention activities alone.    
Change in quality of care. The intervention facilities significantly increased quality of care of MNCH 
services measured on a 100 point scale (Figure 9). The change was most striking in strategy I (50 
percent) than the strategy II site facilities (28 percent). Some of the important changes include: 
introducing antenatal and postnatal care corners, breastfeeding corners, and post-operative rooms; 
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installing a washroom adjacent to the labor room; and separating the sick newborn care unit within 
the pediatric ward of the District Hospital. The facilities managed to increase labor room readiness 
and made sitting arrangements for attendants. 
Client satisfaction. The overall client satisfaction score was highest in strategy I sites relative to both 
the strategy II and comparison sites after adjusting for age, years of education, husband’s education, 
total number of children and religion (Table 8). Both strategy II and the comparison sites performed 
better in terms of providers’ behavior relative to strategy I sites (Table 9). Client satisfaction was 
significantly higher at the strategy I relative to strategy II sites for the medicines being free of cost 
and not requiring extra monetary payment. 
Provider satisfaction. The provider survey indicated that the group work has become more structured 
in complying with guidelines-- strategy I and II site facilities are two and six times, respectively, more 
likely to follow structured guidelines relative to the comparison site facilities controlling for the 
baseline performance. Providers reported higher rate of reception of the supervisory feedback and 
recognition, which were attenuated after adjusting for the baseline performances (Table A.2).  
COST OF MATERNAL HEALTH SERVICES 
Cost per maternal health service unit including antenatal care, institutional delivery and postnatal 
care services is US$ 8 for strategy I and II sites (Table 11). The total incentive cost per unit of 
maternal health service unit is lower at the strategy II sites relative to the strategy I sites ($7 versus 
$9) because of higher number of service units delivered at strategy II relative to strategy I facilities 
while strategy I facilities incurred costs for coupons to the poor clients. 
DISSEMINATION 
A two-day national level dissemination workshop was organized in December 2011 with the Senior 
Secretary, MoHFW as the Chief Guest. The Secretary underscored the role of the P4P models for 
incorporating the quality of care in incentive payments, and incorporation of the institution-based 
incentives to enhance facility rather than individual performance. He put emphasis on examining 
both the DSF and P4P models to better address the MDGs 4 and 5. The participants of the workshop 
put forth suggestions for modification of the two models.  
CHALLENGES 
The prerequisites for initiating a P4P approach for providers with a team approach include 
placement of key human resources and equipping the facilities with equipment and supplies. These 
prerequisites were not entirely met. The weak management information system (MIS) remained a 
challenge for establishing the benchmark level and tracking performance. A simple form was 
developed to ensure proper recording of the key services at both the intervention and comparison 
sites. Obstetrics, newborn and under-five child complications management service volumes could 
not be incentivized on ethical ground although service statistics were monitored, and quality of care 
in complications management was incentivized through incorporating indicators in the quality 
assessment tool. The team dynamics played a key role in facility performance with a few providers 
taking incentives for granted. Measurement of the quality of care of MNCH services underwent 
several revisions to reflect the needs of the facilities. The instrument is appreciated for being 
detailed, but also faced criticism for featuring a long checklist requiring 4 hours to administer. The 
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QAG members decided to divide themselves into two groups to measure the performance of their 
respective units simultaneously. Establishing the financial mechanism to track each payment 
involved multiple providers and clients and keeping vouchers for each transaction remained 
challenging. The competency of the financial operations team was enhanced through an interactive 
workshop, supportive follow-up and on-the-job training.  
LESSONS LEARNED 
Facilities with sub-optimal performance tend to respond to the performance targets in terms of 
increasing quantity and quality of MNCH care if it is tied with incentives, in spite of the human 
resource and other constraints. However, certain level of infrastructure is pivotal to ensure quality of 
care related with offering privacy to the clients. Accountability of the managers and providers can be 
increased through administration of the QAG and QAT tools. The visual tool administered by the QATs 
improves the internal monitoring system. The QAG tool empowers the external experts to measure 
performance and provide constructive feedback. Sharing the tools across all the actors is the key to 
success. Setting institutional targets based on the past performance and providing group incentives 
can increase the cost of delivery per facility if the facilities have, historically, been performing at a 
very low level. In such case, facilities can be enrolled only after achieving a threshold level of 
performance targets in order to minimize the cost of incentive per institutional delivery. Using results 
from the validation for performance measurement is likely to improve providers’ attitude towards 
clients and increase their level of satisfaction. Pre-existing conditions are to be addressed through 
behavior change communication activities to mitigate the demand-side barriers. In order to increase 
utilization, coupon promotion and payment of transportation costs in actual are important. Lastly, 
14-month intervention period is inadequate to bring changes at the outcome level.  
NEXT STEPS 
The P4P models offering incentives to the providers, with or without the demand-side financing, hold 
great potential to enable the health facilities to provide better quality of care in MNCH services 
bringing greater accountability and transparency into the health system. Therefore, these strategies 
should be pursued through the health financing schemes being implemented in Bangladesh.  Given 
that both strategies performed well relative to the comparison sites, it is recommended that strategy 
II (incentives for providers alone) be introduced in the low performing and poorer regions, while the 
poorest areas with greater geographical access limitations would benefit from a combination of a 
demand plus supply side P4P approach. However, expansion should be preceded with another study 
documenting the changes at the population level outcomes. The DSF scheme should consider 
incorporating the quality of care mechanism, group-based incentive payments to the providers based 
on institutional performance, and introduction of vouchers for newborn and under-five children’s 
care.   
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INTRODUCTION 
A pilot operations research project to test Pay-for-Performance (P4P) strategies to improve maternal, 
newborn, and child health (MNCH) services by addressing the supply- and demand-side barriers was 
initiated in Bangladesh in February 2010. United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and Population 
Council (the Council) provided technical assistance to support implementation activities by the 
Directorate General of Health Services (DGHS), Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) of 
the Government of Bangladesh (GoB). The DGHS implemented the intervention activities as a human 
resource innovation project under its 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 operational plans. The study is a 
component of two ongoing GoB-UN projects, namely, the MNCH and maternal and newborn health 
(MNH) projects. The study is funded by the Australian Agency for International Aid (AusAID), Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), the United Kingdom's Department for International 
Development (DfID), and the European Union (EU) through UNICEF. BRAC and CARE Bangladesh, the 
current NGO partners of UNICEF, and the James P. Grant School of Public Health of BRAC University 
collaborated with the Council in carrying out the operations research.  
CONTEXT 
MATERNAL HEALTH 
Bangladesh has made tremendous gains in reducing the maternal mortality ratio (MMR) to 194 per 
100,000 live births in 2010 (NIPORT, Measure Evaluation, and ICDDR,B 2011). The country needs to 
reduce MMR further, to 143 by 2015, to achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 5. In spite 
of the MMR reduction, maternal deaths are unacceptably high, with persistent inequality between 
the richest and the poorest quintiles (NIPORT, Measure Evaluation, and ICDDR,B 2011). Home is still 
the site of 77 percent of deliveries (richest 46% versus poorest 92%), where traditional birth 
attendants with little knowledge and skills are primary service providers (NIPORT, Measure 
Evaluation, and ICDDR,B 2011). Although 54 percent (richest 82% versus poorest 31%) of pregnant 
women receive antenatal care (ANC) from medically trained providers, only one in four women attain 
the four recommended ANC visits (NIPORT, Measure Evaluation, and ICDDR,B 2011). Utilization of 
postnatal care (PNC) is even worse, with only one-third of women receiving PNC within 48 hours of 
delivery from any provider, again with high inequalities (richest 60% versus poorest 16%). Women in 
the richest quintile are three times more likely to seek facility care for complications, and two-fifths 
of women with complications do not seek services because of cost (NIPORT, Measure Evaluation, 
and ICDDR,B 2011).  
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NEWBORN, INFANT, AND UNDER FIVE CHILDREN’S HEALTH 
Newborn, infant, and under five child mortality rates are 32, 43, 53, respectively (NIPORT, Mitra and 
Associates, and MEASURE DHS 2012). According to the Strategic Plan for Health Population and 
Nutrition Sector Development Program (HPNSDP) 2011–2016, the GoB intends to reduce these 
rates to at least 21, 31, 48, respectively, by 2016 (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2011). 
Substantial proportions of newborn deaths are attributed to sepsis, asphyxia, and low birth weight 
(Chowdhury 2008), which can be reduced by increased access to obstetric and neonatal care 
services. Infant postnatal checkup utilization is nearly similar to women’s PNC. Only 30 percent of 
infants receive a check-up from medical provider within two days of birth, with wide disparities 
between poorest and richest quintiles (NIPORT, Mitra and Associates, and MEASURE DHS 2012). 
Findings suggest alarmingly low use of child health care in Bangladesh. Only one in four children with 
diarrheal diseases, and one in three infants with symptoms of acute respiratory infections are taken 
to a health facility or medically trained health provider, respectively (NIPORT, Mitra and Associates, 
and MEASURE DHS 2012). 
FAMILY PLANNING METHODS 
Use of family planning (FP) methods is high in Bangladesh, but the country suffers from low 
utilization of long-term methods, high levels of discontinuation, and unmet need (NIPORT, Mitra and 
Associates, and MEASURE DHS 2012). Although a separate Directorate addresses population 
issues, DGHS-run health facilities do not, generally, cater to the FP needs of the huge number of 
clients, and miss important opportunities for improving FP service coverage. Current contraceptive 
prevalence is 61 percent (NIPORT, Mitra and Associates, and MEASURE DHS), and the country is 
under extreme pressure to achieve replacement-level fertility by increasing modern contraceptive 
use to at least 72 percent by 2016 (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2011).  
CHALLENGES TO MATERNAL, NEWBORN, CHILDREN’S HEALTH AND 
FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES 
The key challenges to reducing maternal, neonatal and under-five child mortality include lack of 
access and inadequate and poor quality of MNCH services. Although the government has developed 
a comprehensive MNCH service delivery infrastructure from grassroots to higher levels, significant 
underutilization of existing capacity results from both demand- and supply-side barriers. These 
barriers can be understood within the context of three delays: (i) delay in deciding to seek care due 
to lack of awareness and social-cultural-gender inequality, (ii) delay in reaching a medical facility due 
to transportation obstacles, and (iii) delay in receiving adequate treatment or management at 
facilities (Thaddeus and Maine 1994). The first two delays reflect demand-side barriers, while the 
third is supply-side, which, in turn, affects demand-side barriers. For instance, low quality, or 
unavailable services at facilities reduce demand for MNCH services. As half of the MMR is directly 
caused by eclampsia and hemorrhage, to further reduce MMR it is critical that public-sector health 
facilities, mostly servicing the poor, significantly improve their emergency obstetric and newborn care 
(EmONC) services. Recent consensus, mindful of the three delays, aims to reduce demand- and 
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supply-side barriers to MNCH services in order to improve basic and emergency obstetric care, 
institutional delivery, skilled birth attendance, and family planning services.  
On the supply side, health facilities often operate at less than capacity in Bangladesh. Shortages of 
qualified staff, essential drugs and supplies, combined with administrative delays and clinical 
mismanagement, are key barriers to improve the quality of MNCH services. The shortage and sub-
optimal performance of service providers are the most important supply-side challenge in 
Bangladesh (Talukder and Rob 2009). Bangladesh is one of the few countries in which physicians far 
exceed nurses and trained midwives, but most physicians are concentrated in urban areas, as rural 
sites do not offer urban amenities and have limited scope for private practice. Shortages in skilled 
health workers are results of weak incentive and low remuneration for public healthcare workers 
(UNICEF 2008). Remuneration of the public-sector providers is well below the private sector, and the 
providers do not receive any performance incentive. As a result, public-sector providers remain 
absent, and tend to refer patients to their own private clinics for personal gain, or alternatively, they 
charge unofficial fees when services at government facilities are supposed to be free or very low 
cost. This situation increases the poor’s out-of-pocket cost and makes obtaining necessary services 
difficult (Rob, Talukder and Ghafur 2006). Poor supervision and monitoring systems, and absence of 
financial incentives, also discourage provider accountability and responsiveness to patients. These 
factors indicate that service providers can be motivated by financial gain tied with performance 
targets.  
INTERVENTION STRATEGIES 
To reduce both demand- and supply-side barriers in Bangladesh, a demand-side financing (DSF) 
scheme was introduced in 2006. Currently, the DSF is being implemented in 53 Upazila Health 
Complexes (UHCs) (sub-district level public-sector health facilities). The DSF, with funding from the 
GoB pool fund, targets the poor with a cash incentive of Taka 2,000 (US$25) for having an assisted 
safe delivery, either in facilities or at home with a skilled birth attendant (SBA). Payees are also 
entitled to transportation cost of Taka 500 ($6.25), from home to the UHC, and an additional Taka 
500 ($6.25) for referral to the District Hospital. In addition, a gift box of one sari, two baby attires, 
two towels and baby-soap worth Taka 500 ($6.25) is provided to pregnant women. In seven of the 
53 UHCs, the DSF is funded by UN partners; in these UHCs, the lump sum cash incentive of Taka 
2,000 (US$25) has been discarded and transportation costs are reimbursed for actual expenditures. 
The DSF also offers incentives to providers based on service volume, varying according to type of 
service. Amounts equal to those paid to providers are deposited in the seed fund, from which 
associated expendable costs are paid. Thus, the DSF for maternal health care in Bangladesh is a 
combination of supply-side incentives for providers and demand-side cash transfers for clients. A 
recent evaluation of the DSF revealed increased service use among the target group although with 
little impact on service quality, misreporting of safe delivery services for financial gain, complex 
management arrangements, delays in fund disbursement through banks, and unofficial charges 
from providers (Schmidt et al. 2010; Koehlmoos et al. 2008).  
In this context, the Council explored possibilities of introducing the Pay-for-Performance or P4P 
scheme to improve maternal health care services by using a consultative process in a series of 
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workshops, funded by the AusAID through Center for Global Development. The government and non-
governmental health service providers, program managers and policymakers overwhelmingly 
supported introduction of the P4P incentive for MNCH service providers in Bangladesh (Population 
Council 2009).  
Based on the study findings and consultative process, the Council collaborated with UNICEF for 
providing technical assistance to the DGHS to test P4P strategies for MNCH service providers to 
improve service volume and quality of care, and for the poor clients to receive services through 
subsidized vouchers or coupons. Using a pre-test post-test separate sample quasi-experimental 
design, the study tests two strategies. The first strategy is a combination of pay-for-performance 
incentive for providers and subsidized coupons for poor pregnant women, newborns, and under-five 
children, while the second strategy employs only pay-for-performance incentive for the providers.  
The P4P approaches are different from the DSF scheme. Firstly, P4P approaches measure the facility 
performance not individual provider’s performance. Secondly, quality of care in providing EmONC 
services is measured and rewarded under the P4P scheme but this important aspect has not been 
included under the DSF scheme. Thirdly, poor pregnant women receive coupons under the P4P 
scheme irrespective of their number of parity while DSF scheme provides vouchers to the poor 
pregnant women who have less than two children, which is a violation of women’s reproductive 
health rights. Fourthly, P4P approaches allow poor pregnant women as well as their newborns and 
under-five children to receive pregnancy, newborn and under-five children’s complications related 
services. In contrast, DSF scheme allows vouchers for receiving pregnancy related services only. 
Fifthly, P4P scheme employed a third party (non-governmental institution) to manage the incentive 
disbursement to the facilities while the payer and the payees are the government under the DSF 
scheme. Finally, coupon and service validation is made by an independent audit firm under the P4P 
scheme while no such validation system is in place for the DSF scheme. 
OBJECTIVES 
The objective of the study is to test and compare the two service delivery models on utilization of 
facility-based delivery, antenatal, postnatal and neonatal care services, and under-five children’s life-
threatening health care services to contribute to improve the maternal, newborn and child health1
 test the feasibility of implementing performance incentives for providers, and clients; 
. 
The specific objectives are to: 
 evaluate whether payment for providers, with or without financing for clients, results in 
increased utilization of antenatal care, postnatal care, institutional deliveries, and family 
planning counseling. 
                                                     
1Initially, the project aimed to increase the pregnancy-related complications management, newborn care and complications 
management, and use of facility-based care for life-threatening but preventable diseases of under-five children. However, 
the stakeholders could not agree on setting targets for complications management on ethical grounds.  
 
P4P Final Report   5 
STUDY DESIGN 
The study employed a separate sample pre-test post-test design with three arms:  one comparison 
and two intervention arms (Figure 1). Two strategies denoted as X1 and X2 are employed in the 
intervention arms for 14 months, while the comparison group is unexposed to any P4P-related 
intervention activities. The first strategy is a combination of the pay-for-performance for facility-based 
providers and subsidized coupon for poor clients while the second strategy employs only the pay-for-
performance incentives for facility-based providers. For being nested within the existing GoB-UN 
MNCH and MNH projects, the community awareness activities coordinated by the NGO partners, 
BRAC and CARE Bangladesh, and the health facility strengthening activities through local level 
planning by UNICEF, remained constant across all the study sites.  
For the supply side, conditional performance incentives are provided to the facility, which includes 
managers, direct and indirect providers related to MNCH services, and relevant administrative and 
support staff. Quarterly targets are set for the facility as a whole, which take into account both 
quantity and quality of services. The Quality Assurance Group (QAG), consisting of specialists from 
the nearby higher-level hospital (Medical College Hospital or District Hospital) and a professional 
body, determines performance targets, performance achievements, and level of incentive payment 
through their quarterly visits. Facilities formed Quality Assurance Teams (QATs) to establish an 
internal monitoring mechanism. 
Figure 1. P4P study design  
Note: X1 and X2 represent intervention activities corresponding to strategies one and two, respectively. O1 to O3 refer to 
observations from the pre-intervention surveys with the poor pregnant women and service providers.  Terms O4 to O6 refer 
to observations from the post-intervention surveys. 
In order to mitigate the demand-side challenges, poor pregnant women and newborns and under-five 
children of poor mothers received financial assistance to meet the costs of transportation, medicines 
and other incidental costs for receiving antenatal care, institutional delivery, delivery-related 
complications management, postnatal care, and complications management for newborns and 
under five children. 
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Comparison between the control and each intervention group and over time allows measuring the 
effectiveness of the intervention strategies. Comparison between the two strategies allows 
measuring the relative effectiveness of the two financing models in terms of changes attributable to 
each program intervention. Given the resource constraints for this study, comparison of 
effectiveness between the two strategies can better inform the policymakers to choose the more 
effective strategy. In case both the strategies indicate positive results, both of them can be applied 
in different settings according to the need. For instance, the first strategy can be applied in the 
poorest regions while the second strategy can be applied in the poorer regions of the country where 
the clients need less support to access the MNCH services. 
STUDY SITES 
Figure 2. Study sites according to strategies 
Table 1. Selected facilities under the P4P project according to study arms 
Strategy I Strategy II Comparison 
Gaibandha Kurigram Jamalpur Thakurgaon 








5. Sunderganj UHC 6. Nageswari UHC 7. Islampur UHC 8. Baliadangi UHC* 
9. Fulchari UHC 10. Bhurungamari 
UHC 
11. Melandah UHC 12. Pirganj UHC 
13. Shaghata UHC 14.Chilmari UHC 15. Bakshiganj UHC 16. Ranisankoil UHC 
Note: Facilities with serial numbers 1 to 8 were selected as comprehensive emergency obstetric and newborn care 
(CEmONC) facilities, and the remaining facilities were selected as basic emergency obstetric and newborn care (BEmONC) 
facilities. UHC stands for Upazila Health Complex or sub-district hospital.  
Baliadangi UHC of Thakurgaon district was excluded due to initiation of the DSF program in 2011. Since there was no 
other CEmONC facility available in Thakurgaon district to replace the facility at Baliadangi, the study activities were limited 
to the remaining 15 facilities.  
P4P Final Report   7 
ACTIVITIES 
PREPARATORY ACTIVITIES 
DESIGNING AND CONSENSUS-BUILDING WORKSHOPS  
In order to design intervention activities and build consensus among the stakeholders, one national 
and four district level workshops were held in March through August 2010, wherein a total of 294 
participants, including policymakers, program managers, researchers, and other stakeholders from 
government, development partners and non-government organizations actively participated. The 
workshops enabled the DGHS to develop guidelines for implementing incentives to providers and 
poor clients, and to form P4P and/or Coupon Committees for leading and managing the 
implementation of activities as well as Quality Assurance Groups for facility accreditation and 
performance measurement. The models of incentive payments for the facility-based providers and 
the coupon clients are depicted in Figures 3 and 4, respectively.  
Model of incentive payment to the facility-based providers 
The key implementers of the provider incentive payment model include the DGHS as the regulator, 
the facility MNCH team as the providers, Population Council as the payment administrator, the QAG 
as the monitor to measure performance in terms of quality of care, and an independent audit firm to 
validate service volume reported by the facilities. The DGHS issued guidelines, following which the 
intervention health facilities formed a P4P Committee which, in turn, identified their MNCH team 
responsible to provide services and receive the incentive payments. Upon receiving an invitation 
from the P4P Committee, the QAG visited each facility to accredit the facility and set benchmark and 
performance targets in discussion with the P4P Committee and the MNCH teams.  The facilities and 
the Council signed a contract allowing them to receive funds that could be paid as incentives to 
individual providers, if the facility achieved the targets.  
The quantitative targets are set at two levels of incentive payments. The first level of target is set at 
twenty percent above the benchmark level, while the second level of target is set a further 20 
percent above the first level of target. The targets are set on a quarterly basis, and the initial 
benchmark is based on the individual facility’s past year’s performance. The targets are set for 
antenatal care, family planning counseling, safe institutional delivery, and postnatal care services.  
The qualitative targets are set for the relevant MNCH service units including the emergency room, 
antenatal care and family planning corner, obstetrics room, labor room, operation theater, pediatrics 
ward, store, pharmacy, laboratory, scrub room and autoclave room. A weighted score on a one-
hundred point scale is used to measure the performance in terms of quality of care. The indicators 
for which facility cannot be held entirely responsible have less weight while the important MNCH 
indicators for which the facility can be held responsible have higher weight. For instance, human 
resource availability related indicators hold weight 0.5 while the signal functions on managing 
EmONC complications for pregnant women, newborn and under-five children have weight 2. The total 
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weighted scores of all the MNCH service units are transformed into a 100-point scale for comparison 
with the previous quarter. 
The facility MNCH team that is eligible to receive incentives includes the managers, direct and 
indirect providers, administrative and support staff at varying level of efforts. The level of effort of 
managers and direct providers is considered 100 percent, and is 50 percent for the indirect 
providers and administrative staff, while for the support staff it ranges from 50 to 100 percent. The 
first level of incentive amount is equivalent to a person’s one-month basic salary for a quarter; and 
the second level of incentive equals one and a half month’s basic salary of the respective providers.   
Figure 3. Incentive payment mechanism for the facility-based providers under the P4P scheme 
Upon receiving the target, the MNCH team attempts to improve the service volume and the quality of 
care. They engage the internal quality assurance teams to enhance the quality of care. At the end of 
the quarter, the QAGs visit the facilities to measure the quality of care following an agreed upon 
checklist. Upon reviewing the facility’s performance, the QAG recommends either rewarding the 
facility with incentives for the providers or not recommending any incentive due to a lack of 
improvement in performance. If a facility achieves both the volume and quality targets, then they 
become eligible to receive performance incentives. Achieving only the quantitative target does not 
allow a facility to receive the incentive. For the first level of incentive, the facility must meet the first 
level of qualitative target coupled with at least the first level of quantitative target; and for the 
second level of incentive, facilities must meet the second level of qualitative target along with the 
second level of quantitative target. 
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The P4P Committees receive an advance payment from the Council to pay incentives to the 
providers by bank transfers. An audit firm, engaged by the Council, validates the payment made to 
the providers, and service volume reported by the facilities.  
Model of incentive payment to the coupon holders  
The key actors for the model of incentive payment for the coupon clients include the DGHS as the 
regulator, the eligible pregnant women and mothers of the newborns and under five children as 
beneficiaries of the MNCH services from the enlisted facilities, the health facilities as the service 
providers, the Population Council as the financial administrator, the Union Family Planning 
Committees as monitors of proper identification of eligible coupon recipients, an independent audit 
firm to validate the incentive payment, and the government fieldworkers as the distributors and 
marketers of the coupon. 
There are five key steps in this model: (i) orienting the service providers, fieldworkers and the 
community leaders so that they can make the community aware of the services available through the 
coupons; (ii) identification of the coupon recipients; (iii) distribution of the coupons, and motivation of 
the coupon holders to utilize the coupon by informing the services available for coupons; (iv) 
payment of coupon incentives in terms of services, medicines, transportation cost, diagnostic 
services, and incidental costs; and (v) validation of selection of the coupon card holders and 
payments made for using the coupons. 
Figure 4. Incentive payment mechanism for the coupon clients under the P4P scheme 
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Coupon cards cover four types of expenses incurred by clients: (a) transportation costs (Taka 500 
(US$6.25) for 4 antenatal and a post-natal care visits, and Taka 300-700 (US$3.75-8.75) for regular 
to urgent institutional delivery and complications care for mothers, newborns and children; (b) costs 
of the medicines that are not available in the facilities, as needed; (c) diagnostic costs, as needed; 
and (d) incidental costs of Taka 100 (US$1.25) per night for a maximum 5 nights for hospitalization. 
The consultation is free of cost at all the public facilities except for the DH, which charges a nominal 
outdoor fee of Taka 5 (US$0.06). 
Nine services are available against coupon for pregnant women: four antenatal care consultations, 
treatment for one pregnancy complication, one delivery at the facility, one postnatal care 
consultation, one postnatal complication treatment, and one postnatal complication follow-up. In 
addition, both newborns and under-five children are eligible to receive free treatment for one 
complication, and a complication follow-up visit. Thus, a total of 13 services are available for each 
package of coupons. The same coupon card is used for receiving multiple services to help the clients 
tracking the relevant MNCH services.  
Eligibility criteria for women to receive a coupon include: i) monthly family income of less than Taka 
4,000 (US$50); ii) ownership of less than 15 decimals of land; and iii) not having any income 
generating assets. These eligibility criteria are similar to that of the DSF model except for a lower 
level for monthly income (Taka 2,500). The DSF model also excludes women who have more than 
two children while no such criterion is used for the P4P project on ethical grounds.  
The fieldworkers prepare lists of eligible women based on their pregnant women’s list and through 
administering the poverty tool following the eligibility criteria. The Union Family Planning Committees 
validate the list of coupon recipients while the P4P and Coupon committee further validates and 
endorses the list. The newborns and under-five children of the eligible women automatically become 
eligible for receiving the services. Fieldworkers distribute the coupons while the facilities provide 
consultation and diagnostic services at free of cost, medicines in kind and make payments for the 
incidental and transportation costs.  
DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLICATION OF GUIDELINES AND MANUAL 
Through an interactive consultation process, the Council developed and published four guidelines 
and a manual for facilitating, requesting, and utilizing P4P incentives and coupon funds. The 
guidelines on pay-for-performance incentives, forming P4P and/or Coupon Committees and QAGs, 
and providing coupons for eligible clients were approved by the DGHS in early October 2010. The 
guidelines describe technical aspects, while the manual depicts financial procedures for incentive 
distribution.  In addition, a Guideline on Maternal and Perinatal Death Review for Gaibandha and 
Kurigram districts was developed in September 2011 following similar work done by the Center for 
Injury Prevention and Research in Bangladesh (CIPRB) for Thakurgaon district.  
DEVELOPMENT OF BCC MATERIALS 
In collaboration with partners, the Council developed brochures on (a) P4P project activities, (b) 
referrals for MNCH complication management, and (c) the coupon mechanism (Figure 5). The first 
brochure gives an overview of the project, while the second and the third brochures provide 
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important information on coupon and referral mechanisms, distribution, and utilization. The coupon 
cards also portray important awareness-raising information and a list of the enlisted facilities. 
 
















FORMATION AND ORIENTATION OF QAGS 
Quality Assurance Groups, the external monitoring teams, were formed for the 12 intervention 
facilities to measure the facility performance every three months. The QAGs for the District Hospitals 
and comprehensive EmONC UHCs were formed with three experts from Rangpur and Mymensingh 
Medical Colleges, and a regional expert of the Obstetrical and Gynaecological Society of Bangladesh 
(OGSB). An obstetrician and a pediatrician of the District Hospital formed the QAGs for the basic 
EmONC UHCs of the respective district. At least one member from the Council and/or the James P. 
Grant School of Public Health joined the experts to facilitate their measurement activities. Two 
workshops were organized for orienting members of the 12 QAGs about their visit objectives and 
members’ roles in August 2010. Workshops chaired by the principals of the Rangpur and 
Mymensingh Medical Colleges encouraged active discussions to generate feedback. The Director of 
Primary Health Care and Line Director, Essential Service Delivery, DGHS underscored the need for 
developing unit-based Quality Assurance Teams within the facility for sustaining the quality of care. 
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FACILITY ACCREDITATION VISITS 
Facilities hosted QAG visits in September 2010 for getting accreditation and to determine 
benchmarks and set the first and second levels of target for the first quarter. Facilities of Gaibandha 
organized the visits in November and December; therefore, the targets, performance and incentives 
for these facilities were set and measured according to the month of the visit. The QAGs gave instant 
feedback to the providers and the internal quality assurance teams while visiting the facility, and 
mentored them to improve the quality of care.  The visits ended with an interactive discussion with 
the P4P Committees in order to set the benchmarks and targets for the first quarter. All the facilities 
received accreditation, but one facility was downgraded as a basic instead of a comprehensive 
EmONC care facility2
FORMATION OF FACILITY-BASED COMMITTEES AND TEAMS 
. 
In order to make the performance incentive functional, the facilities formed P4P and/or Coupon 
Committees, MNCH teams, quality assurance teams, fund operation teams, and community based 
referral teams. 
P4P and/or Coupon Committees: To lead and manage the project implementation activities, six-
member P4P and/or Coupon Committees, headed by the Civil Surgeons/Upazila Health and Family 
Planning Officers were formed. The Committees for District Hospital include the Resident Medical 
Officer as the member-secretary and the President of the local branch of the Bangladesh Medical 
Association, Deputy Director of Family Planning, an NGO representative and Nursing Supervisor as 
committee members. For Upazila Health Complex, the Committees had Resident Medical Officer as 
the member-secretary and an NGO representative, elected female local government representative, 
Upazila Family Planning Officer and Nursing Supervisor as committee members. The Committee is 
known as the P4P Committee for facilities implementing performance incentives for providers only. 
The Committee members meet to review the performance and take necessary measures to improve 
the situation, to arrange the QAG visits and to receive and utilize funds for distributing incentives to 
the providers, and incur expenses for drugs, consumables, and maintenance activities. In addition, 
the P4P and Coupon Committees are responsible for making payment to the coupon holders for 
transportation and incidental costs, acquire drugs, and sign contract with diagnostic facilities in case 
the service is not available within their facility.  
MNCH Teams: The P4P Committees aligned the MNCH teams, including managers, direct and 
indirect providers, and administrative and support staff for providing services and receiving 
performance-based incentives. Numbers of team members in District Hospitals varied from 50 to 84 
(lowest in Gaibandha, a 100-bed hospital and highest in Jamalpur, a 250-bed hospital), while 
members varied from 40 to 51 in UHCs.  
Quality Assurance Teams: Facilities formed QATs to ensure the quality of care at important MNCH 
units to enable the institutions to bring about changes from within (Table 2). Monitoring tools in 
Bangla posted on the walls allowed the QAT team leaders to monitor and record the performance of 
                                                     
2The comprehensive EmONC facilities offer the WHO prescribed nine signal functions while the basic facilities are unable to 
offer cesarean section and blood transfusion services.  
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their respective units twice a month. The Resident Medical Officer and Civil Surgeon/Upazila Health 
and Family Planning Officer monitored the units at least once a month, and recorded their 
observations and suggestions on the tool. The QAGs mentored the QATs and measured their 
performance during quarterly visits, because internal quality assurance is an important aspect to 
improve and sustain the facility performance.  
Table 2. List of Quality Assurance Teams across type of facilities 
Referral Teams: Union3
                                                     
3Union is immediate lower administrative tier to Upazila (sub-district); about 6-10 unions form a Upazila.  
 based referral teams were formed with a total of 1,484 fieldworkers for 
making referrals for MNCH patients with complications in exchange for a nominal referral incentive. 
The referees included the government fieldworkers and NGO workers. The referees received Taka 50 
(US$0.63) for each successful referral. The amount was later raised to Taka 150 (US$1.88) in order 
to reduce the gap with a similar incentive offered by BRAC.  
Fund Operation Teams: Fund operation teams were formed to receive funds, incur expenses and 
settle an advance with the Council following the approved guidelines, financial mechanism manual, 
and standard accounting procedures. The team consists of the Civil Surgeon/ Upazila Health and 
Family Planning Officer, Resident Medical Officer, Head Assistant, and Cashier. Fund operation team 
members are entitled to receive an incentive tied with the overall facility performance.  
District Hospital  Comprehensive  EmONC UHC Basic EmONC UHC 
 Emergency room 
 Autoclave/sterilization room 
 Pharmacy 
 Store 
 Laboratory/pathology  
 Labor room 
 Obstetrics ward 
 Antenatal care, postnatal 
care and family planning 
corner 
 Pediatrics and sick newborn  
ward(s) 
 Operation theatre  
 Emergency room 
 Autoclave/sterilization room 
 Pharmacy 
 Store 
 Laboratory/pathology  
 Labor room 
 Obstetrics ward/ Female ward 
 Antenatal care, postnatal care 
and family planning corner- 
DGHS 
 Antenatal care, postnatal care 
and family planning corner- 
DGFP 
 Female ward (under-five 
children) 
 Operation theatre  
 Emergency room 
 Autoclave/sterilization room 
 Pharmacy 
 Store 
 Laboratory/pathology  
 Labor room 
 Obstetrics ward/ Female ward 
 Antenatal care, postnatal care 
and family planning corner- 
DGHS 
 Antenatal care, postnatal care 
and family planning corner- 
DGFP 
 Female ward (under-five 
children) 
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TEAM-BUILDING WORKSHOPS  
Twenty-four team building-workshops with 579 facility-based managers, direct and indirect 
providers, and administrative and support staff were organized in August and September 2010. Not 
to disrupt services, two workshops for each facility were arranged on facility premises. The 
workshops aimed to revitalize the team spirit among MNCH team members by discussing present 
barriers and motivating staff to be team players for attaining facility targets. The James P. Grant 
School of Public Health designed, developed and facilitated the workshops with inputs from the 
project partners. 
ORIENTATION WORKSHOPS WITH FIELDWORKERS 
Orientation workshops with 1,065 fieldworkers (Health Assistants, Family Welfare Assistants, and 
NGO workers) were organized in October and December 2010 in nine Upazilas. The workshops 
oriented fieldworkers on (a) the P4P project, (b) MNCH referral, and (c) the coupon mechanism. The 
objectives were to enable fieldworkers to work in harmony for strengthening the referral mechanism 
and to identify poor pregnant women for coupon distribution and motivating them to use the 
coupons for receiving MNCH services.     
Considering gaps in the community awareness level, 270 NGO fieldworkers were oriented in nine 
workshops, one in each upazila, in 2011. The fieldworkers received information to enable them to 
orient about 2,500 frontline NGO volunteers living in the community, on timely referring the 
complicated MNCH patients to relevant facilities, and to increase the service uptake for coupon 
holders. 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT WORKSHOP AND SIGNING OF CONTRACTS 
Financial management workshops with fund operation teams were organized to orient and build 
facility capacity for managing incentive funds for providers and patients following the Financial 
Manual and P4P Guidelines. All the facilities held the workshop in 2010 except for Fulchari Upazila 
Health Complex, which organized the event in January 2011. The fund operation team included the 
Civil Surgeon/Upazila Health and Family Planning Officer, Resident Medical Officer, and 
administrative personnel maintaining accounts and records, making payments, keeping stores, and 
providing medicines or diagnostic services to clients. Following the financial management 
workshops, all facilities signed agreements with the Council and opened P4P and/or Coupon 
Committee bank accounts. The contracts were signed by December 2010 except for Fulchari which 
was signed in March 2011. Due to transfer of managerial officers who are the bank account 
signatories, three facilities of Gaibandha opened bank accounts in January through March 2011 
while others opened their accounts in 2010.   
 
P4P Final Report   15 
Photo 1. An impromptu session by a QAG member 
on nebulizer use in the female ward of a facility 
 
INTERVENTION ACTIVITIES 
QAG PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT VISITS 
Facilities hosted the QAG visits in January, April, July, October and December 2011 for quarterly 
performance assessments. During the visits, the QAG members—obstetricians, pediatricians, and 
anesthetists—identified gaps in service delivery and mentored the QAT members. They also 
discussed quality of care issues at length with the P4P Committees and the QATs. The providers 
were refreshed on use of partograph, eclampsia, haemorrhage management, active management of 
third stage of labor, breastfeeding, severe 
dehydration management, newborn 
resuscitation, birth asphyxia, and acute 
respiratory infection management as well as 
infection prevention and waste management 
measures.  
In addition, lab technicians were advised to 
provide timely indent reports using the register 
instead of loose sheets; pharmacists were 
advised to keep last stock balances updated; 
and store keepers were supported to keep 
separate and updated registers for emergency 
and labor rooms, obstetric ward, operation 
theatre, and pediatric ward to avoid delays in 
medical interventions. In addition, QAGs suggested posting duty rosters for providers on the wall, as 
well as notices on the prohibition of monetary transactions, and keeping registers identifying “high 
risk” pregnant women for follow-up services. 
Facilities lacked adequate protocols and behavior change communication materials. Activating the 
MNCH Committees to ensure the local level planning, and making the Death Review Committees 
functional were recommended for improving service quantity and quality. In spite of human resource 
and logistic-related constraints, facilities attempted to improve MNCH services by better utilizing the 
existing resources.  
TRAINING FOR FACILITY-BASED PROVIDERS 
Due to demand identified during the repeated QAG visits and recommendations made by the 
experts, the facilities organized refresher training for nurses on the partograph, active management 
of third stage of labor, newborn care, and infection prevention in Gaibandha, Kurigram and Jamalpur 
district facilities in August through October 2011. Assistant Professors from Medical Colleges visited 
the District Hospital while the experts from the District Hospital visited UHCs to conduct the training.  
COUPON CLIENT SELECTION, COUPON DISTRIBUTION AND UTILIZATION 
In order to identify poor pregnant women for coupon card distribution, 188 and 235 government 
fieldworkers were engaged in Gaibandha and Kurigram, respectively, from January to September 
P4P Final Report   16 
2011. Gaibandha engaged only Family Welfare Assistants while Kurigram engaged equal numbers of 
Family Welfare Assistants and Health Assistants. Lists prepared by the government fieldworkers were 
verified by the Union Family Planning Committee, and later approved by the respective facility-level 
P4P and Coupon Committees. 





Total pregnant women 
identified 
Pregnant women 




Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Kurigram 
Nageswari 15 6,924 58 5,590 59 4,284 53 
Bhurungamari 10 2,584 22 1,812 19 1,812 22 
Chilmari 6 2,320 20 2,059 22 2,059 25 
Sub-total 31 11,828 100 9,461 100 8,155 100 
Identified as poor for receiving coupon out of total pregnant women in Kurigram 80% 
Coupon distribution out of total identified poor pregnant women in Kurigram 86% 
Gaibandha 
Sunderganj 15 3,900 43 3,059 45 3,059 45 
Shaghata 10 3,071 34 2,488 37 2,488 37 
Fulchari 7 2,034 23 1,259 18 1,259 18 
Sub-total 32 9,005 100 6,806 100 6,806 100 
Identified as poor for receiving coupon out of total pregnant women in Gaibandha 76% 
Coupon distribution out of total identified poor pregnant women in Gaibandha 100% 




Identified as poor for receiving coupon out of total pregnant women 78% 
Coupon distribution out of total identified poor pregnant women 92% 
 
 
Three-fourths of the poor pregnant women were identified as eligible for coupon distribution; and of 
them, 92 percent received coupons from the government fieldworkers (Table 3). Although half of the 
pregnant women were initially thought to become eligible for a coupon, the proportion of eligible 
women turned out to be as high as 78 percent, primarily because these are poor communities. 
Coupon card distribution started in January and February 2011 in Kurigram but was delayed in 
Gaibandha until March 2011. Gaibandha District Hospital could not start financial operations 
because its Civil Surgeon In-Charge did not have the financial authority. Another batch of coupon 
cards was distributed from April to July 2011.  
Coupons were distributed only among the 77 percent of the eligible poor pregnant women in 
Nageswari of Kurigram due to unavailability of willing and active fieldworkers. In Gaibandha, coupons 
were distributed using NGO workers in the case of unavailability of the government workers, but this 
was not entirely possible in Kurigram because the NGO operation is relatively recent in the area.   
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Due to poor utilization rates of coupon beneficiaries, 284 fieldworkers were oriented and engaged 
for coupon promotion and validation of the coupon distribution activities in Gaibandha and Kurigram 
districts, in September 2011. Gaibandha employed only the NGO workers, including BRAC Shasthyo 
Shebikas (health volunteers) and Friendship NGO workers while Kurigram engaged a few Health 
Assistants in Nageswari and Chilmari upazilas. 
VALIDATION OF COUPON DISTRIBUTION 
Three-fifths of the total 14,961 coupon card holders were interviewed in order to validate the coupon 
card distribution, and to know about the utilization and reasons for non-use. About 88 percent 
(n=4060) in Gaibandha and 72 percent (n=3057) coupon card holders in Kurigram reported 
receiving the coupons. The others either damaged or lost the cards or did not receive the cards from 
the workers. 
Coupons were utilized mostly for receiving the antenatal care services (79 percent) followed by 
institutional delivery, postnatal care, and pregnancy complications care. About one in ten users used 
coupon for receiving neonatal and under five complication related services (Table 4).   























































Gaibandha 40 74 17 15 14 9 10 
n 1624 1197 268 237 226 150 155 
Kurigram 60 84 16 19 12 9 8 
n 1848 1554 290 355 222 162 154 
Total 49 79 16 17 13 9 9 
n 3472 2751 558 592 448 312 309 
 
The most cited reasons for non-use of coupon is inadequate knowledge about the coupon (41 
percent) followed by not perceiving the need to receive services from the health facilities (22 
percent), long distance and poor transportation facility (9 percent) and delay in receiving the coupon 
(8 percent). The challenges of transportation remained a reality in some places in spite of offering 
the transportation costs reimbursement through the coupon. Travelling to the facilities involving 
multiple vehicles including rickshaw, auto-rickshaw, boat, and bus from the remote char unions is 
cumbersome; and the transportation cost offered was not adequate for round-trip transportation to 
the facilities (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6.  Remote unions of Nageswari Upazila Health Complex of Kurigram district 
 
Figure credit. Md. Julkarnayeen, Population Council. 
 
INCENTIVE GUIDELINES AMENDMENT 
Pursuant to experience from the facilities, the DGHS amended the P4P incentive guideline for 
providers in February 2011. Major changes involved the inclusion of Medical Officer-Civil Surgeon, 
Senior Family Welfare Visitor (FWV), Junior Consultant (Pediatrics), Operation Theatre Boy 
(Attendant), Sterilizer Operator, and Ward Master in the incentive package. Medical Officer-Civil 
Surgeon was included for ensuring smooth communication among facilities and providers, and 
Senior FWV was included for providing family planning services in District Hospitals, while others had 
been inadvertently not included in the original guidelines. Medical Technologist (Radiography) was 
excluded from the MNCH team. Another amendment to the Guideline was made in August 2011, 
which increased referral incentives for fieldworkers from Taka 50 to 150 (US$0.63 to 0.1.88), 
because BRAC, in the same area, provides Taka 150 for assisting home delivery while referral under 
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REVIEW MEETING WITH NGO PARTNERS 
A review meeting with UNICEF and NGO partners, BRAC and CARE Bangladesh, was held in Dhaka in 
April 2011. As BRAC also incentivizes poor clients, participants discussed how to avoid duplication, 
as well as coupon distribution, the referral system, and NGO worker orientation. Considering the 
insufficiency of one-way transportation cost reimbursement, it was decided that a coupon beneficiary 
who is also a BRAC beneficiary will be reimbursed from both BRAC and P4P project in order to help 
her covering the round-trip transportation cost. BRAC staff will ensure that there is no duplication in 
providing medicines free of cost to such clients. BRAC is unable to reach all the poor clients with the 
full benefit due to fund limitation; therefore, the P4P and BRAC initiatives are complementary and 
not wastage of the resources.  Since P4P study tests supply-side versus demand-plus-supply-side 
approaches, subsidies by both BRAC and P4P will not affect the P4P study design, although added 
advantage of client incentives will not be separately attributable to either BRAC’s MNCH or the P4P 
project. 
FACILITY FUND MANAGEMENT 
The 12 facilities under the Arms 1 and 2 spent US$432,913 from October 2010 to November 2011. 
This amount represents the incremental expenditures incurred in addition to the usual government 
and UNICEF funding. Since no incremental cost has been incurred, the comparison facility costs 
have not been analyzed. To help settle advance funds, the Council arranged and paid for training 
and on-the-job training. The trainers visited all the three districts to train and help facilities in fund 
disbursement upon expense incurred. An audit firm verified the facility expense reports before 
liquidation. Eight facilities of strategy I and four facilities of strategy II spent $262,495 (61 percent) 
and $170,418 (39 percent), respectively. On average, each facility under strategy I spent $32,812 
while each facility under strategy II spent $42,605 over the 14-month intervention period. The total 
average expenditures of the strategy II facilities are higher because the facilities spent from about 
one and a half times to twice the amount spent for incentive payments to the providers, referral 
incentives payments to the fieldworkers, and for purchasing supplies, consumables and 
maintenance.    
Facilities across both the strategies spent most of the total expenditures to pay incentives to the 
providers (strategy I sites - 78 percent and strategy II sites - 95 percent) (Figure 7). Facilities of 
strategies I and II spent almost the same proportions of the expenditures to pay referral fees to the 
fieldworkers and for purchasing supplies, consumables and maintenance (Figure 7).  
Strategy I facilities spent about one-fifth of the total expenditure for incentives to the coupon clients; 
the highest proportion was spent for reimbursing transportation costs to the coupon clients (8 
percent) followed by purchasing drugs (7 percent). The incidental and diagnostic costs registered the 
lowest proportion of expenditures, because incidental costs are incurred only in case of 
hospitalization while diagnostic costs are incurred only by the comprehensive health facilities. 
Gaibandha District Hospital could not identify suitable diagnostic facilities and the CEmONC UHC of 
Gaibandha turned into a basic EmONC UHC; therefore, these facilities failed to offer this benefit to 
the coupon clients.     
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Figure 7. Distribution of liquidated expenses according to the head of expenditure across strategies
VALIDATION OF INCENTIVE PAYMENT AND RECEIVING SERVICES FROM THE FACILITY  
An audit firm investigated if the facilities correctly reported the number of clients of MNCH services, 
and validated if the coupon clients received the intended benefits. 
A total of 1,026 clients were selected from the facility registers; of them, 96 percent were available 
for interview. All the clients reported receiving services from the facilities. Four-fifths of the 
respondents reported receiving drugs; the rate was universal in Jamalpur (99 percent), followed by 
Kurigram (84 percent) while over two-fifth participants in Gaibandha reported not receiving any 
medicine. No clients reported receiving diagnostic services in Gaibandha and Jamalpur, and only 11 
percent received them in Kurigram. All the facilities lagged behind in providing diagnostic services. In 
spite of having incentive funding for providing diagnostic services, facilities under strategy I failed to 
provide these important services to the clients. The UHCs are supposed to provide the diagnostic 
services free of cost while the DHs realize expenses for providing this service. The CEmONC facilities 
of strategy I sites were encouraged to sign contracts with outside facilities in order to provide the 
sonography (ultrasonography) services. But only one out of the three CEmONC facilities signed a 
contract with diagnostic service centers. The diagnostic service centers were non-cooperative over 
the payment of value added tax (VAT), without which contracts could not be signed between the 
facilities and diagnostic centers. Interestingly, the reported level of satisfaction with the services is 
the highest in Gaibandha (92 percent) followed by Kurigram (75 percent), and Jamalpur (61 
percent). 
Ten percent of coupon clients (n=941) during April to September 2011 were randomly selected and 
validated if they had had received the intended benefits. About two-thirds of the coupon clients 
reported receiving medicines (three-fourth in Kurigram and about half in Gaibandha). Almost all the 
coupon clients (95 percent) received the transportation cost but only one in ten reported receiving 
the diagnostic cost.  Overall, nine in 10 coupon clients reported satisfaction with the services.  
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EVALUATION ACTIVITIES 
FACILITY MIS  
Facility based management information system (MIS) data have been collected from the 15 facilities 
for 26 months, from October 2009 to November 2011. The MIS data have been extracted from the 
monthly reports and registers maintained at the facilities. Council researchers collected the 
information directly from the facilities in cooperation with the facility staff. District Coordinators 
monitored the data collection and a Data Management Specialist collated and checked quality of the 
data for consistency and accuracy. The MIS data on monthly performance have been the key to the 
measurement of the quantitative targets pursued and achieved by the facilities, and for evaluating 
the MNCH service delivery in terms of quantity across facilities and strategies. The facilities, 
administered by the DGHS, do not usually record data on family planning counseling, therefore, a 
form to record this information was developed, which was administered at all the study sites. 
Strengthening the MIS may result in increasing the reporting and act as a confounder. In order to 
avoid such bias, MIS support was provided to all the facilities at the same time. However, the data 
collectors were not blinded because two data collectors per district had to be stationed at the district 
level for continuous and multiple data collection activities who knew about the on-going facility 
activities. However, they were part of the evaluation team, and remained detached from the 
intervention activity facilitators. 
QAG VISITS 
The QAGs made five quarterly visits at the 12 facilities from October 2010 to December 2011. The 
QAG members administered three types of QoC checklists appropriate for the District Hospitals, 
UHCs providing comprehensive EmONC services, and UHCs providing or basic EmONC services. QAG 
visits were not made at the comparison sites. Therefore, quality of care measured by the specialists 
is compared only across the intervention districts and strategies.   
PROVIDERS’ SURVEY 
Separate samples of providers were interviewed for baseline (n=272) and endline surveys (n=201) 
from the 15 facilities using a semi-structured questionnaire on motivation and problems faced in 
carrying out the MNCH services (see Table 5). Survey participants included managers and direct 
providers including the doctors, consultants and nurses. Data have been entered and analyzed using 
the SPSS program. The samples are not significantly different, both between the three arms and over 
time, except that more managers participated in the baseline survey at the strategy I facilities than in 
strategy II sites; and more males participated in the end line relative to the baseline survey at the 
comparison facilities than at the strategy I facilities (Table 5).  
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Table 5. Characteristics of the interviewed providers across strategies and over time 
  
Strategy I Strategy II Compari-
son 
Strategy I vs 
Comparison 
Strategy II vs 
Comparison 
Strategy I vs 
Strategy II 
T0 T1 T0 T1 T0 T1 T0 T1 T0 -
T1 
T0 T1 T0 -
T1 
T0 T1 T0 -
T1 
Position Percent 2 value (level of significance) 

























59 58 57 55 62 40 
Sex       
         


















Female 64 57 60 58 72 57 
Age Years F test value (level of significance) 


















deviation 9.2 9.3 8.9 8.5 9.1 9.6 
Education                


















deviation 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.4 1.7 
N 135 99 79 55 58 47          
~p<.1; ns- non-significant at p>0.05. T0- Baseline; T1- Endline; T0 -T1- Over time: Baseline versus Endline. FWV- 
Family Welfare Visitor 
 
CLIENT EXIT INTERVIEWS  
Client exit interviews were carried out at the 15 health facilities among the MNCH clients after 
receiving services from May 2011 to November 2011 (Table 6). The client exit interviews were 
carried out during the intervention period to measure the on-going quality of care of services. The 
Council researchers conducted the interviews and entered data into an MS Access software after 
cross checking and editing. Data were entered twice to ensure the quality. District Coordinators 
monitored the data collection and a Data Management Specialist collated and checked quality of 
data for consistency and accuracy. Exit client interview data have been analyzed using the SPSS 
14.0 for Windows. The samples between both the strategy sites and the comparison sites are 
significantly different in terms of religion, age and education of the respondents (Table 6). More 
participants at the strategy II sites were Muslim followed by strategy I and comparison sites; the 
samples differ also between the two strategy sites in terms of religion and husband’s education. The 
comparison site respondents were younger, had fewer children, and had higher level of education 
than that of the strategy I and II sites. 
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Table 6. Characteristics of client exit interview respondents across arms 
 
Characteristics Strategy I Strategy II Comparison 





Strategy I vs 
Strategy II 
Religion  Percent 2 value (level of significance) 
Islam 92 97 88 5.9* 36.5*** 20.3*** 
Age  Years F test value (level of significance) 
Mean 23.2 23.5 22.6 1.96* 2.8** 1.2 (ns) 
Standard deviation 5.2 4.7 5.1    
Education       
Mean 5.1 5.5 6.1 4.7*** 2.6** 1.8~ 
Standard deviation 3.6 3.9 3.7    
Husband’s education       
Mean 4.4 5.6 5.4 4.1*** 0.6 (ns) 5.1*** 
Standard deviation 4.4 4.8 4.5    
Total children       
Mean 1.6 1.5 1.4 2.3* 0.9 (ns) 1.7~ 
Standard deviation 1.2 1.0 1.1    
N 1125 587 412    
***p<.00; **p<.01; *p<.05; ~p<.1; ns- non-significant at p>0.05. N is 2,124 except for husband’s education 
for which the N is 2,097.  
 
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS WITH THE CLIENTS 
In-depth interviews were carried out with 270 women who received MNCH services during the 
intervention period from the 15 facilities to learn about the contextual factors as well as the benefits 
and the challenges that they encountered in receiving care from the facilities (Table 7). The samples 
between the strategy I and II sites and the comparison sites are significantly different in terms of 
respondents’ level of education, with respondents from strategy I sites having the lowest mean 
number of years of education, while respondents at the comparison sites have higher levels of 
education (Table 7). 
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Table 7. Characteristics of in-depth interview respondents across arms 
 
Characteristics Strategy I Strategy II Comparison 
Fvalue  





Strategy I vs 
Strategy II 
Age (years)   
Mean 23.2 24.4 23.5 0.2 ns 0.9 ns 2.6 ns 
Standard deviation 5.4 5.7 5.1    
Education (years)       
Mean 5.1 5.8 7.2 14.9*** 4.6* 1.7 ns 
Standard deviation 3.5 3.9 3.4    
N 144 69 57    
***p<.00; **p<.01; *p<.05; ~p<.1; ns- non-significant at p>0.05. N is 2,124 except for husband’s education 
for which the N is 2,097.  
RESULTS 
Feasibility of implementing performance incentives for providers and clients is measured in terms of 
operationalization of the incentive schemes, increased volume of services and improvement in 
quality of care of the MNCH services at the intervention facilities. Comparison across strategies and 
control sites indicates payment for providers, with or without financing for clients, results in 
increased utilization of MNCH services including the antenatal care, postnatal care, institutional 
deliveries, and family planning counseling. 
CHANGES IN SERVICE VOLUME 
The percentage change in service volume over time for institutional delivery at both the strategies I 
and II facilities was significantly higher relative to the comparison facilities (Table Appendix A.1). 
Antenatal and postnatal care volumes increased significantly at the strategy I facilities relative to the 
comparison facilities. The benchmark levels of antenatal and postnatal services of strategy I facilities 
were significantly lower relative to that of the comparison facilities, which may have contributed to 
the significantly higher level of percentage changes in service volume of these services over time 
across the strategy I  facilities. The benchmark may have varied due to the differences in social 
determinants, contextual factors, and level of functionality between the strategy I and comparison 
site facilities.  
The facilities of strategy I registered significantly higher changes in providing antenatal care, 
postnatal care and institutional delivery services relative to the strategy II facilities although the 
service volumes across the strategy I and II sites did not significantly vary before initiation of the 
intervention activities. 
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Figure 8. Percentage changes in maternal health service volumes over time across the three sites
On average, Upazila Health Complexes doubled the average number of institutional deliveries each 
quarter at the intervention sites while the District Hospitals increased institutional deliveries by 38 
percent (not shown).  The Upazila Health Complexes at the intervention sites almost tripled and 
quadrupled the average volume of antenatal and postnatal care services, respectively, while the 
District Hospitals increased these services by 39 and 70 percentages, respectively (not shown).
The quarterly average performance of family planning counseling during the intervention period 
between strategies I and II indicates better performance at the strategy II relative to the strategy I 
site (602 vs 236, p= 0.07). Comparison between the first and the last quarter’s performance 
revealed that the change was significant at the strategy I site, and non-significant at the strategy II 
site. The family planning counseling service was not properly recorded at the comparison health 
facilities making comparison between the intervention sites and the comparison site impossible. 
However, it indicates the lesser priority attached to this service if the service is provided at all.    
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CHANGE IN QUALITY OF CARE 
The intervention facilities significantly increased quality of care of MNCH services over time 
measured on a 100 point scale (Figure 9). 
Figure  9.  The change in overall quality of care score, and percent changes in the score related to 









***p<.001; **p<.01. Score measured on a 100 point scale.
The change was higher at the strategy I facilities relative to that of the strategy II facilities since the 
benchmark scores of quality of care was significantly lower for strategy I facilities relative to the 
strategy II facilities. The level of change was most striking in Kurigram (57 percent) followed by 
Gaibandha (44 percent) and Jamalpur (28 percent) districts. Since the quality of care score was not 
measured in the comparison facilities before and during the project period, no comparison across 
the intervention and the comparison facilities can be made during this period. However, in a follow-
up study, the difference between the scores was measured in which both the strategy I and strategy 
II facilities achieved significantly higher scores relative to the comparison facilities in 2012.    
The QoC score increased gradually from the average score of 54 out of 100, measured during the 
facility accreditation visits in 2010, to 85 at the final quarter of 2012, which indicates that bringing 
about changes in the quality of care is a time consuming process (Figure 10). Multivariate analysis 
using the repeated measures procedure, modeling the quarterly QoC scores across districts 
indicated a statistically significant effect of quarters on incentive-induced quality of care scores, F (5, 
5) = 19.20, p<.003. There is an interaction between the districts and quarters (F(10, 12) = 2.78, 
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Photo 2. Labor room readiness enhanced with 
functional spotlight, curtain and sterilized 
equipment 
as that of Kurigram in the following quarters. Kurigram district stood at the same level as that of 
Gaibandha, but it outperformed the latter district in the successive quarters.  
Figure 10. The change in overall quality of care score related to MNCH services over time
Changes were especially noticeable in the labor room, obstetrics ward, autoclave, and 
antenatal/postnatal and family planning corner. Some of the most significant changes include: 
 Introducing ANC and PNC corners, 
breastfeeding corners, and post-operative 
room; 
 Separating the sick newborn care unit within 
the pediatric ward of District Hospital; 
 Increasing labor room readiness and better 
equipping it, with partograph maintenance, 
installing toilets adjacent to the labor room, 
and making sitting arrangements for 
attendants; 
 Initiating better management of newborn 
care with newborn resuscitation training;  
 Improving facility cleanliness; and 
 Separating un-sterile and sterile areas of the 
autoclave room.  
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INCENTIVE LEVEL ACHIEVED 
In terms of incentive level achievement, with minimum 0 and maximum 2 scores, strategy II facilities 
consistently outperformed the strategy I facilities (p<0.01). Strategy I facilities gradually shifted from 
low to high performance level of incentive achievement while achievement levels for the strategy II 
facilities remained constant across the study period (Figure 11). 









Client exit and in-depth interviews measured the client satisfaction as well as challenges the clients 
faced in receiving the services across the study arms. The overall satisfaction score was highest in 
strategy I sites relative to both the strategy II and comparison sites after adjusting for age, years of 
education, husband’s education, total number of children and religion. The background 
characteristics were adjusted in order to account for the existing variability across the strategies. The 
level of client satisfaction remained similar across the strategy II and the comparison sites (Table 8). 
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Photo 3. Maternal, newborn and child health coupon 
card allowed poor clients better access to services  







95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Strategy-I 2.16 .07 2.02 2.31 
Strategy-II 1.60 .18 1.26 1.95 








95% Confidence Interval for Difference 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 




.13 .15 .75 




.20 -.59 .38 




.19 .100 1.01 
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. a Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
F (9, 2087) = 13.66, p<.000. The model adjusted for age, education, total number of children, husband’s education and 
religion.  
 
The individual items on level of client satisfaction revealed that offering free-of-cost services and 
medicines, and not requiring extra money 
have caused higher satisfaction level at the 
strategy I sites (Table 9). However, the 
strategy II and the comparison facilities 
performed better in terms of providers’ 
behavior relative to strategy I sites. The 
client satisfaction level was significantly 
lower at the strategy II sites relative to the 
strategy I sites except for the satisfaction 
that was reported due to providers’ good 
behavior while the differences between the 
strategy II sites and the comparison sites 
were not significant.     
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Table 9. Component of satisfaction with MNCH services across arms 











Mean difference (significance) 
Model 1: Providers 
behave well 
F (9, 2087) = 8.66, 
p < .000. 
Mean 0.29 0.51 0.48 -0.19* 0.03 -0.22* 
Standard 
error 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07 
Model 2: 
Treatment is good 
F (9, 2087) = 2.25, 
p < .017. 
Mean 0.85 0.79 0.79 0.06 0.00 0.06 
Standard 
error 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.05 
Model 3:  
Free service 
F (9, 2087) = 5.9, p 
< .000. 
Mean 0.27 0.17 0.14 0.13* 0.03 0.10 
Standard 
error 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 
Model 4:  
Free medicine 
F (9, 2087) = 40.28, 
p < .000. 
Mean 0.37 0.06 0.16 0.20* -0.11 0.31* 
Standard 
error 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.05 
Model 5:  
No need to pay 
extra money 
F (9, 2087) = 17.40, 
p < .000. 
Mean 0.20 0.01 0.08 0.12* -0.07 0.19* 
Standard 
error 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.  a Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
The models have been adjusted for age, education, total number of children, husband’s education and religion.  
In-depth interviews with respondents reported several advantages and constraints faced in the 
facilities (Table 10). Similar to the findings of client exit interviews, behavior of the doctors, nurses 
and other service providers is better at the strategy II and comparison sites relative to strategy I 
sites. Receiving free treatment and drugs caused higher satisfaction at the intervention sites relative 
to the comparison sites. However, the comparison sites performed better than the intervention 
facilities in terms of providing advice on complications during pregnancy, and the regular visits made 
by the doctors and nurses (Table 10).Thus, the financial incentives paid to the providers did not 
affect their behavior towards the clients at the strategy I sites, and the providers’ behavior remained 
the same across strategy II and comparison sites. 
Receiving services and medicines at free of cost can greatly impact upon the satisfaction level of the 
clients, which is illustrated in case studies 1 and 2. The case study 2 further revealed why providing 
transportation and other costs may not automatically induce the pregnant women to deliver at the 
facilities.    
The challenges reported at the comparison sites included not providing free of cost services, 
medicines and financial incentives, having the long waiting hours, not providing advice on family 
planning, not maintaining privacy during physical examination, not supplying food, and extra 
payments that are to be made to the ayas (support staff-nurse aides). Overall, one-fifth of the 
respondents reported ill behavior of the nurses as cause of dissatisfaction. Thus, the financial 
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incentives paid to the providers had limited effect on the clients’ satisfaction with the quality of care 
in terms of doctors and nurses’ visits and their behavior with the clients.  
Table 10. Advantages and challenges faced in the facilities, as reported by in-depth interview 
respondents across arms (in percent) 
Advantages/challenges Strategy I Strategy II Strategies I &II Comparison 
ADVANTAGES     
Doctors, nurses and other service providers 
are well behaved 64 75 70 79 
No  problem occurred during admission or 
service 53 42 48 46 
Received advice on complications during 
pregnancy/ child care/ vaccination 42 36 39 51 
Doctors came regularly on visit 39 43 41 47 
Received free treatment from the hospital 82 78 80 4 
Privacy maintained during physical 
examination 40 41 40 42 
Nurse came regularly on visit 37 19 28 47 
Some medicines are provided by the 
hospital 68 28 48 19 
Quality  of service is pleasant 41 36 39 30 
Patients do not have to wait long for 
admission 0 17 9 37 
Received advice on family planning/ 
demonstrated with apparatus 15 9 12 32 
Hospital is clean  4 0 2 37 
Financial incentive are provided 37 0 19 0 
CHALLENGES 
Some medicines are not free 48 75 62 89 
No advice given on newborn care, post 
pregnancy complications and care 24 39 31 56 
Patients have to wait to receive services 21 29 25 58 
No advice offered on family planning  17 10 14 54 
No financial incentive is provided  7 0 3 61 
Do not provide information on coupon 26 91 59 0 
Nurses/other providers are ill behaved 18 17 18 19 
Privacy not maintained during physical 
examination 7 4 6 25 
Food not supplied from the hospital 5 3 4 23 
Delivery performed by nurse 10 6 8 9 
Hospital is not clean 13 1 7 9 
Vehicle problem to reach the hospital 3 0 1 14 
Ayas are to be paid extra money 3 1 2 12 
Have to pay for physical examination 1 0 0 14 
N 144 69 213 57 
P4P Final Report   32 
Case study 1: Delivering a baby at a facility that provides quality of care  
After having the first delivery at home, Nileema (fictitious name) got admitted to an Upazila 
Health Complex facility for her second delivery. She has been coming to the facility to receive 
antenatal care services since her early pregnancy every month. In each check up, either a doctor 
or a nurse examined her pulse, weight and position of the baby. Doctors advised her on 
pregnancy planning and preparation. She wanted to deliver at home, as she did during birth of 
her first child. But when she met with prolonged labor pain, she was taken to the hospital. The 
doctors examined her, administered with injection and waited for 3-4 hours. Finally, she had to 
undergo a cesarean section. Five service providers including two doctors and nurses were 
present at the time of operation. After operation, Nileema stayed at the hospital for 6 days.  
Doctors and nurses visited her regularly and advised her on post pregnancy complications and 
newborn care. She is satisfied with the overall condition of the hospital and quality of care 
received from the facility. 
Since Nileema had to pay for the medicines only, she viewed this as a free-of-cost service. She 
reported full satisfaction with the behavior of the doctors, nurses and other service providers. 
According to her, quality of service has improved at the facility, especially due to expansion of 
service provision, such as, cesarean section. The cost of operation at the facility is much lower 
relative to that of a private clinic.  
(Case profile: 23-year old married female, mother of two children,  
housewife, completed ninth grade of education) 
Case study 2: Patients’ readiness– a key to utilization of subsidized cost services against coupon  
Salma (fictitious name), a mother of three, gave birth to all of her children at home. After getting 
referred by a fieldworker, she visited the hospital in order to receive antenatal care during her last 
pregnancy. Salma reported improvement in the services of the facility relative to the previous 
years because during one of her previous pregnancies, she came to the hospital, but the provider 
did not attend her. This time, the nurse behaved well; she measured weight and pressure, 
advised her on pregnancy complications and handed some iron tablets for free. She was advised 
to get admitted in the hospital when her water broke. For being a coupon card holder, she 
received transportation cost of Taka 100 (US$1.25) - she was very pleased with the money. 
However, she had to wait long before receiving the service, and privacy was not maintained 
during the physical examination. 
Despite having a coupon card that offers transportation cost, medicines and incidental costs, 
Salma decided to deliver at home with her mother-in-law performing the delivery. She and the 
baby were healthy after the labor. However, when the child was 14-day old, she started suffering 
from convulsion and had to be rushed to the hospital. The child was hospitalized for 3 days. The 
treatment cost was not much, and the entire expenses were later reimbursed with the coupon 
card. Doctors and nurses came on regular visits and behaved well. Salma was satisfied with the 
services that her baby received except for an initial delay occurred during the admission. Earlier 
she used to visit a doctor at the market place, but upon receiving the coupon she started visiting 
the hospital. 
(Case profile: 26-year old married female, mother of three children, handicraft artist, completed 5th 
grade of education) 
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PROVIDERS’ PLACEMENT, SUPERVISION AND RECOGNITION 
Incentive payments to the providers are supposed to improve their motivation and performance 
level. For measuring the group performance, the team work and spirit are to be enhanced and 
providers are to feel appreciated and receive regular monitoring visits, feedbackand recognition.  
The group work has become more structured when following guidelines in both intervention groups 
relative to the comparison facilities (Table A.2). This change was more pronounced at strategy II 
facilities relative to strategy I facilities (Figure 12). A binary logistic regression analysis controlling for 
the baseline performance indicated that strategy I and II facilities are twice and six times, 
respectively, more likely to follow structured guidelines relative to the comparison facilities (strategy I 
OR=2.39, 95% CI, 1.03, 5.55, p<0.043; strategy II OR=5.84, 95% CI, 2.75, 12.42, p<0.00 ). 
Receiving regular feedback and appreciation from the supervisors increased at both the strategy 
sites; and the changes over time are significantly different at the intervention sites relative to the 
comparison sites, but the changes were attenuated upon adjusting for the pre-existing differences 
between the strategies. However, providers at both the strategy I and II sites were two times more 
likely to receive appreciation (strategy I OR=2.07, p<.136; strategy II OR=2.13, p<0.076) from their 
supervisors after adjusting for the baseline performance. 
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COST OF MATERNAL HEALTH SERVICES 
Analysis of the cost of incentive payments at all intervention sites shows that the additional cost per 
quarter per facility for each maternal health service unit is US$ 8 only (Table 11). Maternal health 
services include antenatal care, institutional delivery and postnatal care services for which the 
facilities had set targets. The incentive costs include the costs of incentive payments to the 
providers, referral incentives paid to the fieldworkers, and costs of supplies and maintenance that 
were incurred at the facilities of both strategies I and II. In addition, strategy I facilities incurred costs 
for coupon-related payments to the clients and purchase of essential medicines that are not usually 
available through the government system. Hence, the total cost per maternal health service unit is 
lower at the strategy II sites relative to the strategy I sites ($7 vs. $9). Average providers’ incentive 
cost per quarter per facility is much higher at the facilities of strategy II than strategy I ($8,059 
versus $5,098), because they engaged more beneficiaries due to the presence of higher number of 
eligible beneficiaries, and they also achieved higher levels of incentive than that of the strategy I 
facilities. However, by achieving much higher numbers of maternal health service units (1,307 
versus 723 per quarter per facility), the providers’ incentive payment cost is lower by US$ 2 per 
maternal health service unit at the strategy II sites than at the strategy I sites. 
 
Table 11. Incentive costs per maternal health service unit per quarter by intervention study arms 
 
Sites Average total incentive 
cost per quarter per 
facility (US$) 
Average number of maternal 
health service units per 
quarter per facility 
Incentive cost per 
maternal health 
service unit 
Strategy I 6,562 723 9 
Strategy II 8,521 1,307 7 
All intervention 
sites 7,215 918 8 
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Photo 4. The Chief and Special Guests listening to 
the participants on the second day of the workshop 
 
DISSEMINATION 
NATIONAL DISSEMINATION WORKSHOP 
A two-day national level dissemination 
workshop was organized in December 2011 
with the Senior Secretary, MoHFW as the 
Chief Guest. The Director, Primary Health 
Care and Line Director, Maternal, Newborn, 
Child and Adolescent Health (MNCAH), DGHS 
chaired the workshop. Managers and 
providers of both the P4P and DSF 
implementing districts and upazilas as well 
as the policymakers, researchers and 
development partners took part in the event. 
The Senior Secretary underscored the 
importance of the P4P model for incorporating the quality of care and incorporation of the institution-
based incentives offered to the providers in order to enhance the facility performance. He put 
emphasis on examining both the DSF and P4P models to better prepare Bangladesh to address the 
MDGs 4 and 5. The participants put forth suggestions for modification of the two models.   
SUGGESTIONS ON MODIFICATION OF THE DSF MODEL 
Based on the lessons learned from the implementation of a quality of care framework under the P4P 
study, the workshop participants unanimously agreed to incorporate the QoC measurement system 
into the DSF scheme. For this purpose, consultants from District Hospitals may make quarterly visit 
to the Upazila Health Complexes to assess the providers’ qualitative performance. The additional 
cost for involving a QAG of two members visiting from the District Hospital to the UHC is $150 per 
quarter per facility. Thus, a target of 20 percent increase in the QoC score, for example, from 50 to 
60 out of 100 points, will incur $15 per unit of QoC improvement. For an internal quality assurance 
system, unit-based “quality assurance teams” can be formed to monitor and review performance 
every week and ensure coordination between team members. In providing incentives to the 
providers, institutional instead of the individual approach has been suggested. Introduction of 
referral incentives for fieldworkers to promote institutional delivery and inclusion of neonates and 
under-five children’s services were recommended to better address the MDG 4. 
SUGGESTIONS ON MODIFICATION OF THE P4P MODEL 
The workshop participants suggested establishing an additional reward system for acknowledging 
the outstanding individual performer in each facility along with the existing institution-based 
incentive mechanism. Fieldworkers and their supervisors are to be incorporated as beneficiaries, 
and a district approach is preferable for building an effective referral system.  Expanding the quality 
assurance system at all upazilas can be challenging due to limited availability of experts from the 
tertiary-level hospitals. Therefore, experts from the districts are suggested to make the performance 
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measurement visits to upazilas. Finally, the QAG tools are to be automated for better administration 
of the assessment and instant access to the reports.   
CHALLENGES 
 Meeting the prerequisites. The prerequisites for initiating a performance incentive scheme 
with a team approach include placement of key human resources and equipment and 
supplies. But these were not entirely met. Some facilities are chronically constrained by 
turnover and vacancy in key human resource positions like anesthesiologist and obstetrician. 
Lack of training/refresher training on the EmONC and integrated management of childhood 
illnesses hindered quality improvement to the highest desired level. Ineffective utilization of 
the MNCH funds limited the capacity of the QATs to bring into the ideal changes. The District 
Hospitals that have 100 beds and UHCs of 31 beds were constrained in terms of space, and 
were not able to offer adequate level of privacy, food and other amenities to the clients. 
Besides the providers were over-burdened, especially with higher demand created through 
the coupon distribution in strategy I sites.  
 Weak health information system. A strong health information system providing timely and 
accurate data is vital to measure performance. The weak MIS remained a challenge to 
establish the benchmark levels and track the performance. Therefore, special forms had to 
be developed for collecting data from a number of registers maintained by several providers. 
In some cases, providers were found not keeping records; in such cases, for instance, for 
family planning counseling it had been difficult to establish a benchmark level. An automated 
MIS and training on record keeping, as envisioned by the DGHS, may solve such problems. 
However, strengthening of the MIS should remain constant across all sites along with the 
comparison sites in order to ensure that changes in the service volume due to strengthening 
of the MIS do not get accounted for against the incentive related intervention.  
 Awareness on the incentive mechanism. Although incentive calculation for the providers is 
simple (e.g., each receiving one-month basic salary for a quarter’s performance), not every 
beneficiaries well understood the process at the beginning. Turning over of the staff in the 
middle of the quarter required complicated calculation of proportional payment. Placing 
some MNCH team nurses at the different units of facilities hindered the intended tie 
between the payment and performance.  
 Incentivizing the EmONC complications management. Obstetrics, newborn and under-five 
child complications management service volumes could not be incentivized on ethical 
ground although service statistics had been monitored for tracking performance. Quality of 
care in EmONC complications management was incentivized through incorporating indicators 
in the quality assessment tool. 
 Team dynamics. The team dynamics played a key role in facility performance.  A few 
providers took the incentive as granted; they received incentives without any effort due to 
improved facility performance by a number of providers. Therefore, the P4P Committees 
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were given responsibility to ensure payment to the performing providers only. Some providers 
expressed dissatisfaction for not receiving incentives due to non-performance of other units. 
They were advised to create peer pressure to improve the facility performance in 
consultation of the P4P Committees.   
 Measurement of the quality of care. The measurement of the quality of care of MNCH 
services underwent several revisions to reflect the needs of the facilities. The instrument is 
appreciated for being detailed, but also criticized for being a long checklist requiring at least 
4 hours for its administration. The QAG members later decided to divide themselves into two 
groups to measure their respective units simultaneously except for the operation theater, 
and the initial and closing decision-making feedback sessions with the P4P Committees.  
 Financial mechanism. Establishing the financial mechanism to track each payment and 
services involving multiple providers and clients and keeping vouchers for each transaction 
remained challenging. The competency of the financial operations team was enhanced 
through interactive workshop, supportive follow-up and on the job training. Issuing of account 
payee checks saved time to draw, count and disburse cash. However, if all beneficiaries 
maintained accounts in the bank, the process could be simplified by writing a single letter on 
bank transfer. The clients received cash for non-repetitive incentive amount for 
transportation or incidental costs; and fieldworkers for referring cases to intervention 
facilities. With the introduction of mobile cash transfer, challenges relating to cash transfer 
can be better addressed in future.  
LESSONS LEARNED 
 Facility response to the incentive. Facilities with sub-optimal performance tend to respond to 
the performance targets in terms of increasing quantity and quality of MNCH care if it is tied 
with incentives in spite of the human resource and other constraints. Managers and 
providers become innovative to improve the services. However, non-functional facilities 
cannot be incorporated into the program without upgrading them to a certain functional 
level. 
 Motivation. Motivation level varies across providers. Nurses, indirect providers, 
administrative and support staff perceive more financial benefits than doctors and 
consultants for having lower opportunity cost of time. Special acknowledgement and reward 
system can be developed to motivate the doctors.  
 Human resources and infrastructure. Key human resources are to be placed and provided 
with necessary training and refresher training. Mentoring through the quality assurance 
groups provides impromptu insights on key issues, but it does not replace the need for 
formal training to increase competency of the providers to offer better care. The facilities also 
need to improve the infrastructure in case of higher bed occupancy in order to ensure better 
care. 
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 QAG and QAT tools. Accountability of the managers and providers can be increased through 
administration of the QAG and QAT tools. The visual tool administered by the QATs improves 
the internal monitoring system. The QAG tool empowers the external experts to measure 
performance and provide constructive feedback. Sharing the tools across all the actors is the 
key to success of the program. Outcome indicators need to be included in the tool. 
 Target threshold levels. Setting institutional targets based on the past performance and 
providing group incentives can increase the cost of delivery per facility if the facilities 
historically have been performing at a very low level. In such case, facilities can be enrolled 
only after achieving a threshold level of performance targets in order to minimize the cost of 
incentive per institutional delivery.   
 Health information system. Weak health information system hinders measuring the 
performance. Introducing any incentive mechanism needs strengthening of the MIS.   
 Client response to the incentive. The coupon clients responded well in terms of receiving the 
antenatal care services but were reluctant for having deliveries at the facilities. Intensive 
advocacy at the community levels and increasing the quality of antenatal care may 
encourage them to plan delivery at the facilities. Certain level of infrastructure is pivotal to 
ensure quality of care in terms of offering privacy to the clients. Roundtrip transportation cost 
should be paid in actual and awareness raising activities are must to generate demand for 
services. 
 Validation. Incorporating the auditor’s validation on service volume and exit client interviews 
measuring the client satisfaction is important. Considering results from the validation into 
performance measurement is likely to improve providers’ attitude towards clients and 
increase their level of satisfaction.  
 
 Inadequate time for interventions. The 14-month intervention duration has been highly 
inadequate to carry out the intended intervention activities to bring about changes at the 
outcome level. In order to ensure the complete care for the pregnant women among at least 
two cohorts of the pregnant women to bring sustainable change in the community requires at 
least a 24-month intervention period for evaluation.    
 
NEXT STEPS 
The need for performance-based financing programs on key maternal, newborn and child health care 
services is beyond dispute, especially until the MDG targets are met and the health systems are 
further strengthened. Given the increasing emphasis on the quality, introduction of quality of care 
measures into the DSF program is critical. In this regard, the experiences, tools and findings of the 
P4P pilot study can be useful to improve the maternal and newborn health community served by the 
DSF program. The DSF model is poised for national level expansion; therefore, it can be modified to 
incorporate the QoC framework tested in the P4P project after intensive consultation and discussion. 
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The services against vouchers can also be expanded for the newborn care and under-five children’s 
complications management to reduce the newborn, infant and under-five child mortality under the 
DSF program. 
In the non-DSF but high priority and low performing areas with high level of maternal, newborn and 
child mortality and morbidity, the P4P model has the potential to improve the health facility response 
in providing improved quality and volume of MNCH services. The modified model needs to be tested 
at a larger number of facilities and with a longer duration.  
The research design compromised at the pilot study should be avoided in future evaluations to 
enable the measurement of the outcome indicators by carrying out population-based surveys. For 
example, an evaluation using baseline and endline surveys across the intervention and comparison 
groups could inform the changes occurring at the population level in terms of met need, service 
utilization, client satisfaction, morbidity and wellbeing of the clients. For validation through 
triangulation, it is important to collect and analyze the service statistics data. In the absence of 
population-based surveys, the current study employed service statistics data alone. However, due to 
resource constraints, each strategy did not have similar number of facilities; therefore, variability 
remained high in the unbalanced design. 
The P4P models offering incentives to the providers, with or without the demand-side financing, hold 
great potential to enable the health facilities to provide better quality of care bringing greater 
accountability and transparency into the health system. Therefore, these strategies are to be 
pursued under the health financing schemes of the country.  
Given both the strategies performed well relative to the comparison site, the strategy II with 
incentives for providers alone can be introduced at the low performing but poorer regions; while the 
poorest areas with greater geographical draw back will benefit from a combination of a demand plus 
supply side P4P approach. Clients living in the regions with poorer geographical accessibility are 
likely to have higher demand side barriers in terms of transportation cost and other socio-
demographic indicators; therefore, they may benefit more from demand side financing for essential 
MNCH services relative to clients living in the regions with limited geographical constraints.  
It is acknowledged that monetary incentives alone are NOT enough to improve the MNCH services. 
The long-term solution is about putting a stronger system in place through placing the adequate 
human resources, strengthening the facilities with necessary equipment, drugs and supplies, making 
the quality assurance system functional, providing mentoring and coaching, supervision, and 
strengthening the health information system and governance to address the health system building 
blocks for improving the quality of care in order to improve the quality of life of the patients; and also 
improving the work environment and satisfaction of the providers. Linking with incentives may 
facilitate achieving these goals. 
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Table A.3. Average quarterly services on pregnant women, newborn and under-five complications 
management across arms and over time 
 




































































Diff % 85% 164% -22% 
~Two tailed paired t-test significant at p<0.10; *p<0.05.
Note. Differences between Strategy I and Comparison sites, and Strategy II and Comparison sites as well as 
between Strategy I and Strategy II sites for delivery and newborn complications management services are non-
significant. Differences between Strategies I and II for under-five children’s complications management services are 
non-significant. However, differences between Strategy I and Comparison sites for under-five children’s complications 
management services are significant at p<0.05; and the differences between Strategy II and Comparison sites for 
under-five children’s complications management services are significant at p<0.10 .    
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